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SUMMARY
The aim of the article is to present the issues related to the time limits set for individual organs 
of public authority (the Sejm, the Senate, the President of the Republic of Poland) for the perfor-
mance of specific activities within the legislative procedure. These time limits should be calculated 
according to conventional rules, that is, from the beginning of the day following the day on which 
the act on which the legal provisions are binding begins. However, the action will also be effective 
if it is performed on the same day on which the said event occurred. Violation of the time limit in 
legislative proceedings is of fundamental importance for the act, as a normative act, within the scope 
of its validity. As part of the review of the constitutionality of the law, the Constitutional Tribunal 
also examines the correctness of the proceedings in which the law was adopted. According to the 
latest jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, violation of the minimum time limits required for 
the performance of individual activities, which have only been specified in the Rules of Procedure 
of the Sejm, may constitute an independent basis for declaring the entire act unconstitutional. This 
view differs significantly from the existing, well-established approach to this subject. The effects of 
violating the time limits of the legislative procedure can also be considered at the level of the rights 
(competences) of individual authorities within a specific proceeding. The signing of the act by the 
President after the expiry of the constitutional time limit should be deemed legally effective. The ad-
missibility of issuing by the Constitutional Tribunal of scope judgements should be considered in cases 
of violation of the rules of correct legislation, leading to the omission or reduction of vacatio legis.
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Legislative proceedings (also known as the legislative procedure or legislative 
process) are all activities undertaken by authorized entities, the goal and final result 
of which is the adoption and entry into force of the statute1. The purpose of the 
proceedings is to express an opinion on the further fate of the bill submitted in the 
exercise of the right of legislative initiative. The authorities participating in the 
legislative procedure are, first of all, the Sejm, the Senate and the President of the 
Republic of Poland.
The legislative procedure should be considered in the context of the constitu-
tional principles of the system. First of all, it concerns the principle of a democratic 
state ruled by law (Article 2 of the Polish Constitution2) and the principle of the 
rule of law (legalism; Article 7 of the Polish Constitution). On the one hand, the 
activities in the proceedings are the implementation of the competences of indivi-
dual state organs, conferred on them by the provisions of the Constitution. On the 
other hand, the statute is the basic source of universally binding law, with the help 
of which it is possible to interfere in the legal situation of individual legal entities 
(addressees), including natural persons.
Thus, the legal regulation of law-making activity follows from the principle of 
legality. Every action of organs of public authority in this respect must be based on 
the provisions of the Constitution or on legal statutes adopted on its basis, which 
create the competence of this organ. On the other hand, exceeding the time limits 
defined by the Constitution by any organ is equated with its loss of legitimacy3.
Any violation of procedural rules is violation of the law and of the principle of 
legality. However, this does not mean that each such violation will have legal effects, 
or that the possible consequences will be the same for each violation. In connection 
with the above, it is reasonable to investigate the possible legal consequences of in-
dividual procedural violations. These effects can be analyzed from different points of 
view. The most important, however, seem to be the effects that refer to the statute as 
a normative act, within the scope of its validity. The consequences for the sphere of 
rights of individual participants in a specific legislative procedure are also important.
Within the procedural provisions, one can distinguish a regulation concerning 
procedural time limits. This issue is noteworthy as the provisions of the Polish 
Constitution do not formulate the rules for calculating the time limits referred to 
1 See entry: Postępowanie ustawodawcze, [in:] A. Szmyt (ed.), Leksykon prawa konstytucyjnego. 
100 podstawowych pojęć, ed. A. Szmyt, Warszawa 2016, p. 245.
2 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 483 
as amended), hereinafter: the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Polish Constitution, or the 
Constitution. English translation of the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/
kon1.htm [access: 10.12.2020].
3 See B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2012, pp. 77–78.
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therein and do not directly indicate the legal consequences related to the infringe-
ments made. This means that it is possible to have doubts, not only as to the legal 
consequences that can be attributed, but also whether, in a given factual situation, 
the infringement took place at all. This article aims to consider these issues.
There is no comprehensive study on time limits in legislative proceedings. It 
is worth noting that in recent years decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal have 
been issued, which may herald a change in the existing jurisprudence. For the first 
time, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the entire act was inconsistent with the 
Constitution (the provisions indicated by the applicant) due to failure to meet the 
time limit for legislative proceedings, which had its normative basis only in the 
rules of procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland4. In connection with the 
above, there is a need to review the views previously expressed on the violations 
of time limits in the legislative proceedings.
The results of the research may turn out to be important for entities participating 
in the legislative procedure, participants of the proceedings before the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, as well as for individual units that are addressees of legal norms.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TIME LIMITS 
IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
The exercise of rights (competences) and the performance of legal obligations 
may be specified in time. In this context, time limits are a normative approach to 
time. As part of the legislative procedure, it is possible to indicate a number of 
procedural time limits, most often absolutely marked, defining a period of time by 
indicating the number of days and months. They find their normative basis both in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well as in the Rules of Procedure of 
the Sejm5, the Rules of Procedure of the Senate6 and in statutes7. One can also see, 
in the principle of discontinuation of the work of parliament, a specific final date 
which has no clear legal basis8.
4 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2020, Kp 1/19; judgement of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of 14 November 2018, Kp 1/18. Judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal 
are available on the Internet Rulings Portal (IPO) at https://ipo.trybunal.gov.pl/ipo/Szukaj?cid=1.
5 Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 July 1992 (consolidated text 
M.P. 2019, item 1028 as amended).
6 Rules of Procedure of the Senate of 23 November 1990 (consolidated text M.P. 2018, item 846 
as amended).
7 Act of 23 June 1999 on the Exercise of Legislative Initiative by Citizens (consolidated text 
Journal of Laws 2018, item 2120).
8 M. Radajewski collected the views of the doctrine and jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Tribunal regarding the essence and source of the principle of discontinuation, and also listed the issues 





It should be borne in mind that within the legislative procedure one can dis-
tinguish the ordinary9 procedures and urgent10 procedures, as well as procedures 
required for statues on adopting the budget11 or on amending the constitution12. 
Depending on the type of procedure, some differences have been introduced that 
also apply to procedural time limits (most often they shorten them).
To be able to speak of a violation of the time limit, it must first be calculated. 
This means setting its starting point and ending point if we are considering a time 
limit which is a certain period, or one point if we are looking for a time limit which 
is a point in time. It should be noted that there are two basic ways to calculate time 
limits. In the doctrine, calculating the course of a time limit to the day, hour and 
minute (a momento ad momentum) is called computatio naturalis. On the other 
hand, calculating the time limit from day to day (dies a quo) is called computatio 
civilis13. The advantages of the latter include the exclusion of the need to establish 
the exact moment when the event occurred, which marks the beginning or end 
of the time limit. In practice, this translates into a reduction of possible evidence 
problems14. This way of calculating time limits is conventional, as it uses certain 
assumptions that detach the starting and ending moments from the exact moment 
when legally significant events occurred15.
In publications considering the problem of calculating constitutional time limits, 
the most common methods of calculating them according to computatio civilis16 are 
indicated. One can discern various sources of the application of these rules – from 
the use of characteristic linguistic phrases in the content of constitutional provi-
sions (setting time limits by indicating the number of months and days instead of 
excluded from the application of this principle. See M. Radajewski, Wyjątki od zasady dyskontynuacji 
prac polskiego parlamentu, „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2020, no. 2, pp. 155–170.
9 Articles 118–122 of the Polish Constitution.
10 Article 123 of the Polish Constitution.
11 Articles 219–225 of the Polish Constitution.
12 Article 235 of the Polish Constitution.
13 See, in particular, I. Nowikowski, O regułach obliczania terminów w procesie karnym (kwestie 
wybrane), [in:] Teoretyczne i praktyczne problemy współczesnego prawa karnego. Księga jubileuszo-
wa dedykowana Profesorowi Tadeuszowi Bojarskiemu, eds. A. Michalska-Warias, I. Nowikowski, 
J. Piórkowska-Flieger, Lublin 2011, pp. 877–894.
14 See M. Kulik, Przedawnienie karalności i przedawnienie wykonania kary w polskim prawie 
karnym, Warszawa 2014, p. 222.
15 See R. Orłowski, Calculation of Time Limits Resulting from the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland from April 2, 1997 (Selected Issues), „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2019, no. 6, 
pp. 322–323.
16 See L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 98 Konstytucji, [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
Komentarz, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2000, p. 9.
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the number of hours and minutes), through the use of analogia iuris reasoning or 
analogi legis, to the direct application of statutory provisions17.
It should therefore be stated that the time limit counted in days ends with the 
expiry of the last day of the time limit (i.e. at 24.00). If it begins with an event, the 
time limit begins with the beginning of the next day (i.e. at 00.00). If a time limit 
is calculated in weeks, months or years, it ends on the expiry of that day in the last 
week or month that corresponds with its name or date to the starting day. If there was 
no such day in the last month, the time limit expires on the last day of that month18.
However, no justification can be found for several solutions that are common 
in the currently binding administrative and court proceedings. This applies to the 
principle according to which, if the end of the time limit for performing an activity 
falls on a statutory holiday (possibly also on Saturday), this time limit expires on 
the next weekday. There is also no possibility of suspending (except for the situa-
tion specified in Article 122 para. 6 of the Polish Constitution) or interrupting the 
running of the time limit, nor can it be restored.
Particularly noteworthy is the method of calculating the end of the term of of-
fice of the Sejm in the context of the principle of discontinuation of parliamentary 
work. It was clearly defined as “the day preceding the assembly of the Sejm of the 
succeeding term of office” (Article 98 para. 1 of the Polish Constitution). There 
is, however, a close connection of this point in time with the official date set by 
the President of the Republic of Poland. The first meetings of the Sejm and the 
Senate are convened by the President of the Republic of Poland19, as a rule, “on 
a day within 30 days following the day of the elections”  (Article 109 para. 2 of 
the Polish Constitution).
VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURE AND CONTROL 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
The course of the legislative procedure is assessed as part of the procedure 
before the Constitutional Tribunal, as part of constitutional review20. The actual 
law-making effect is attributed only to judgements stating the non-conformity of 
the object and patterns of control (including the so-called simple rulings and scope 
rulings). It consists in eliminating the challenged provision as the editorial unit of 
17 For more on the calculation of time limits and the legal justification of the methods used, see 
R. Orłowski, op. cit., pp. 315–328.
18 Ibidem, p. 323.
19 See L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 98 Konstytucji…, p. 10 and the literature cited therein.
20 The legal regulation concerning the Constitutional Tribunal was included in Articles 188–197 
of the Polish Constitution and in the Act of 30 November 2016 on the Organization and Procedure of 
Proceedings Before the Constitutional Tribunal (consolidated text Journal of Laws 2019, item 2393).





a normative act (all legal norms that can be interpreted from a specific provision, 
in the case of a simple ruling) or a specific legal norm (one of the legal norms that 
can be interpreted from a specific provision, in the case of a scope ruling)21.
It is assumed that the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal resolving a ques-
tion of law22 is also universally binding. This means that in accordance with the 
view established in the science of law that any other court, when examining a case 
similar to the one in question, should refuse to apply a provision ruled as lacking 
the conformity to the Constitution23. Thus, it can be concluded that the effect does 
not refer to the aspect of the validity of a normative act, but to the possibility of 
its application.
The rules of procedure before the Constitutional Tribunal will be of deci-
sive importance for the assessment of the effects of procedural violations in the 
framework of legislative proceedings. In particular, it concerns the principle of 
accusatorial procedure and the presumption of the conformity of a normative act 
to the Constitution.
According to the principle of accusatorial procedure, only entities specified in 
the provisions of the Constitution24 are authorized to initiate proceedings. Addition-
ally, when adjudicating, the Tribunal is bound by the scope of the appeal indicated 
in the application, question of law or constitutional complaint. The scope of the 
appeal covers the indication of the challenged normative act or its part (specification 
of the subject of control) and the formulation of the allegation of non-compliance 
to the Constitution, ratified international agreement or act (indication of the control 
pattern25). The Tribunal examines both the content of such an act or contract as well 
as the competence and compliance with the procedure required by law to issue an 
act or to conclude and ratify a contract26.
The principle of the presumption of constitutionality can be considered in two 
aspects. On the one hand, it should be equated with the presumption according to 
which a statute unchallenged with the final verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal 
should be considered compliant with the constitutional regulation (the system 
founding rule of the presumption of constitutionality)27. On the other hand, the 
21 L. Bosek, M. Wild, Kontrola konstytucyjności prawa. Komentarz praktyczny dla sędziów 
i pełnomocników procesowych, Warszawa 2014, pp. 198, 200–202.
22 The legal grounds for the court to submit a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal is 
Article 193 of the Polish Constitution.
23 B. Banaszak, op. cit., p. 997 after M. Safjan, Skutki prawne orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyj-
nego, „Państwo i Prawo” 2003, no. 3, p. 16.
24 It is primarily about Articles 191 and 79 of the Polish Constitution.
25 Article 67 para. 1 and 2 of the Act on the Organization and Procedure of Proceedings Before 
the Constitutional Tribunal.
26 Article 68 of the Act on the Organization and Procedure of Proceedings Before the Constitu-
tional Tribunal.
27 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 February 1997, K 19/96.
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principle of the presumption of constitutionality can be equated with the procedural 
principle in force in proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. The principle 
is related to the determination of the burden of argumentation in the proceedings 
before the Constitutional Tribunal and applies to all subjects and patterns of con-
trol. It is not about the “obligation” to show that a given act is inconsistent with 
a hierarchically higher act, but about the procedure of the Constitutional Tribunal in 
non liquet situations, when there are doubts as to the compliance of a normative act 
with a hierarchically higher act, but they are not serious enough to unequivocally 
determine the defectiveness of the act under examination28.
The above-mentioned reservations are extremely important for the assessment 
of the effects of violation of time limits in the legislative procedure. In a situation 
where an act has passed the entire legislative procedure, has been published and has 
become part of the legal order, the identification of any possible defects may only be 
bindingly ascertained under a procedure specially established for this purpose by the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Due to the limited number of entities authorized to initiate 
such proceedings, it may happen that, despite obvious procedural violations in the 
legislative process, the constitutional review will not be launched. Moreover, any 
possible defects may go unnoticed during the proceedings before the Constitutional 
Tribunal. It should be noted, however, that the Tribunal is obliged to thoroughly 
examine the case, and it examines the correctness of the legislative procedure ex 
officio, regardless of the requests of the participants in the proceedings. Therefore, 
it should be noted that the effect in the scope of the validity of a normative act will 
never result from the mere fact of the existence of a defect in the legislative process.
The essence of the constitutional review of the law also determines the control 
patterns. In the case of an act that is the subject of such control, the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland will be its control model. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that only the violation of procedural rules set out in the rules of 
procedure of the chambers, which will also lead to the violation of constitutional 
elements of the legislative process29, or occur with such intensity that it prevents 
deputies from expressing their views on individual provisions and the entire act30, 
in the course of the work of committees and plenary sessions, will be of significant 
importance.
The position presented above, which can be described as traditional, was firmly 
established both in the doctrine and in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribu-
28 Regarding the previous legal status, see L. Bosek, M. Wild, op. cit., p. 95.
29 A significant violation of the legislative procedure was found to be, for example, a vote in favor 
of the Senate’s amendments (instead of their rejection) and a misinterpretation of the result of voting on 
these amendments (judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 5 October 2017, Kp 4/15), or presentation 
to the President by the Marshal of the Sejm of a different content than that adopted in the framework 
of parliamentary work (judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 July 2003, SK 38/01).
30 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K 4/06.





nal. However, attention should be paid to the latest decisions of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, namely the judgement of 14 July  2020 (Kp 1/19) and the judgement of 
14 November 2018 (Kp 1/18). The Tribunal took the position that the violation of the 
rules of legislative procedure, which had their source in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Sejm, violated the principle of legality (Article 7 of the Polish Constitution). It was 
emphasized that by adopting the rules of procedure, the Sejm would self-terminate 
with the provisions of this act. Therefore, the Sejm should abide by the provisions of 
the law it has adopted. It does not matter that the chamber has the power to change 
these regulations at any time by adopting an appropriate resolution. A catalog of 
conditions has also been formulated that should be considered before considering 
that a violation of the regulations is also a violation of the Constitution. It is necessary 
to examine “the importance of the subject matter, the significance of the infringed 
provisions, the stage of legislative work at which the violation occurred, the effect 
of any violations as well as the scale and frequency of violations”31.
However, there are doubts as to the correctness of the adopted control pattern 
and the possibility of formulating different legal assessments in the face of the same 
facts (the same violations under the legislative procedure). It was also indicated that 
the new decisions constitute a significant departure from the previously presented 
position, which poses a risk of violating legal relations. Many bills came into force 
despite the defects during the parliamentary stage of the legislative procedure, 
which had not been thoroughly examined before32.
SPEED OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS
As shown by statistical research on the actual course of legislative proceedings, 
they may differ significantly in terms of their duration, counted from the moment of 
the implementation of the legislative initiative, to the moment of their publication 
in the Journal of Laws33. The decisive factor here is the length of the proceedings in 
31 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July  2020, Kp 1/19; judgement of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of 14 November 2018, Kp 1/18.
32 See dissenting opinion of judge of the Constitutional Tribunal M. Muszyński to the judgement 
of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2020, Kp 1/19.
33 It is worth paying attention to the following studies: Z. Gromek, Przebieg procedury usta-
wodawczej w Sejmie VIII kadencji – analiza ilościowa, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2020, no. 4, pp. 31–62; 
D. Chrzanowski, W. Odrowąż-Sypniewski, Analiza projektów ustaw wniesionych do Sejmu II kadencji, 
„Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, no. 2, pp. 31–69; D. Chrzanowski, W. Odrowąż-Sypniewski, P. Radzie-
wicz, Analiza projektów ustaw Sejmu III kadencji (20 października 1997 r. – 20 października 1998 r.), 
„Przegląd Sejmowy” 1999, no. 1, pp. 79–116; J. Lipski, R. Tymiński, Analiza projektów ustaw wnie-
sionych do Sejmu w toku całej IV kadencji, [in:] Ustawy 2001–2005. Sejm IV kadencji, ed. T. Muś, 
Warszawa 2006, pp. 9–64; J. Sokołowski, P. Poznański, Struktura procesu legislacyjnego w analizie 
ilościowej, [in:] Wybrane aspekty funkcjonowania Sejmu w latach 1997–2007, eds. J. Sokołowski, 
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the Sejm, both in the first stage of the proceedings leading to the adoption of the bill, 
as well as in the matter of expressing opinions on the Senate amendments. In this 
regard, there are no binding time limits, understood as the maximum time during 
which the Sejm would exercise its powers.
Special time limits, specifying the minimum time that should elapse to proceed 
to a specific stage of the legislative procedure in the Sejm, find their legal basis in 
the Rules of Procedure of  the Sejm. Traditionally, it has been indicated that they are 
only of an instructional nature, and their possible shortening or extension may not 
constitute grounds for challenging the legality of the act for formal reasons by the 
Constitutional Tribunal34.
As regards the ordinary legislative procedure, the first reading may be held no 
sooner than on the seventh day following the delivery of the draft bill to the deputies, 
unless the Sejm or a committee decide otherwise35. The second reading may be held 
no sooner than on the seventh day following the delivery of the committee report to 
the deputies, unless the Sejm decides otherwise36. On the occasion of the proceedings 
on the Senate’s amendments, consideration of the committee report by the Sejm may 
take place not earlier than the third day from the delivery of the report to the deputies, 
unless the Sejm decides otherwise37. Still, other minimum time limits have been in-
troduced for the processing of bills on amendments to the Constitution and codes38.
The above-mentioned regulations should be viewed through the prism of the 
recent decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal. It was in the judgement of 14 July 
2020 (Kp 1/19) that the Tribunal decided that the entire act was unconstitutional, as 
the minimum time limits set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm relevant for 
amending codes were not met. At the same time, the Constitutional Tribunal indi-
cated that the infringement consisting in proceeding with the bill in an inappropriate 
manner may be corrected, provided that the appropriate time limits suitable for the 
correct procedure are observed39.
When analyzing the above-mentioned regulations, it can be concluded that the 
ordinary procedure by the Sejm should last no less than 14 days or 17 days if the 
P. Poznański, Kraków 2008, pp. 237–280; O. Kazalska, J. Maśnicki, M. Żuralska, Analiza działal-
ności ustawodawczej Sejmu VI kadencji, Warszawa 2012; M. Żuralska, A. Brudnoch, K. Dąbrowska, 
M. Sierzputowska, Analiza działalności ustawodawczej Sejmu VII kadencji, Warszawa 2017.
34 It was indicated by, i.a., L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art 119 Konstytucji, [in:] Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej…, p. 12; S. Patyra, Tryb pilny w teorii i praktyce procesu ustawodawczego 
pod rządami Konstytucji z 1997 r., „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2011, no. 1, p. 77; Z. Gromek, 
op. cit., p. 47. Otherwise: A. Szmyt, Uwagi na marginesie trybu pilnego, [in:] Regulamin Sejmu 
w ekspertyzach i opiniach Biura Studiów i Ekspertyz Kancelarii Sejmu, Warszawa 2001, pp. 229–230.
35 Article 37 para. 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
36 Article 44 para. 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
37 Article 54 para. 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
38 Articles 86i, 89 and 95 of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
39 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2020, Kp 1/19.





Senate adopts amendments to the act. This solution is to guarantee the possibility 
of active participation of individual deputies in the legislative proceedings. The 
mere reading of the documents relating to a specific procedure (bill, its justification, 
committee report) is a time-consuming process. Obviously, in order to meet the 
procedural requirements, it does not matter whether a given deputy actually got 
acquainted with these documents or had basic information about the subject of the 
act at the time of voting.
As practice shows, legislative proceedings may begin and end on the same day. 
This means that on the same day the right of legislative initiative was exercised 
and the adopted act was signed by the President. During the eighth term of office 
of the Sejm, such a situation took place once, while in five subsequent cases the 
entire procedure was completed in seven days40. The first of the indicated acts did 
not become the subject of proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. However, 
there are doubts about at least two aspects.
The first one relates to the method of calculating constitutional time limits us-
ing the conventional method, i.e. in accordance with the principle that the period 
specified in days begins to run on the day following the day on which a specific 
event occurred, to which the provisions of law bind the beginning of this period. In 
our considerations, these would be the following events: 1) submission of the text 
of the enacted bill to the Senate by the Marshal of the Sejm, after its adoption41; 
2) submission of the text of the enacted bill to the President by the Marshal of 
the Sejm, after the end of the parliamentary stage of the proceedings42. The issue 
is whether the next steps were performed after the opening of the time limit for 
a specific activity, and whether such activity should be given legal effect.
Although there is no clear indication in the text of the Constitution or the regu-
lations of the Sejm and Senate, legal enforceability should also be assigned to such 
activities that were performed on the same day, if, of course, the event marking 
the beginning of the time limit actually occurred. So there is no need to wait until 
the beginning of the next day43. Adopting a different view would lead to excessive 
procedural formalism.
40 Z. Gromek, op. cit., p. 39. During one day, the work on the bill included in the Sejm Paper 
no. 2663 was completed; however, in seven days, the proceedings regarding the bills included in the 
Sejm Papers no. 10, 12, 793, 886 and 3398 were completed.
41 Article 121 para. 1 and 2 of the Polish Constitution; Article 52 para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
42 Article 122 para. 1 and 2 of the Polish Constitution; Article 56 para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.
43 This is a tendency that has been gradually adopted (not without hesitation) as part of the 
practice of applying a number of proceedings provided for by law, on the basis of filing appeal by 
the parties on the same day on which the quest.
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Therefore, in the case of the bill, the proceedings on which were completed 
within one day, we will not be dealing with violation of the constitutional time 
limits for legislative proceedings. It should be emphasized once again that “the 
speed of the legislative procedure in itself cannot constitute a declaration of un-
constitutionality”44. Such proceedings, however, raise doubts as to guaranteeing 
deputies, senators and the president the opportunity to read the documents and time 
for reflection necessary for them to exercise their powers thoroughly.
When analyzing the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal, one may come to 
the conclusion that the possibility of taking a position on the bill was guaranteed 
if during the plenary and committee meetings it was possible to express one’s 
opinion (both on the merits and the procedure), which was confirmed in the report. 
However, it is hard not to get the impression that in some cases it would be only an 
apparent option, due to the lack of adequate time to consider the position reported. 
At the same time, there is no clear and objective criterion for assessing this issue45.
The speed of legislative proceedings is connected with the so-called urgent 
procedure and  fast-tracked legislation. The first of these legal institutions has its 
constitutional basis in Article 123 of the Polish Constitution. The Council of Min-
isters may classify a bill adopted by itself as urgent, with the exception of tax bills, 
bills governing elections to the Presidency of the Republic of Poland, to the Sejm, 
to the Senate and to organs of local government, bills governing the structure and 
jurisdiction of public authorities, and also drafts of law codes46. The most import-
ant effect of considering the bill as urgent is the shortening of the constitutional 
time limits for taking a position on the future law by the Senate (14 days instead 
of 30 days) and the President (7 days instead of 21 days). The Constitution also 
determines that the regulations of the chambers are to provide for certain differences 
regarding the legislative procedure concerning the urgent bill.
The aforementioned regulations will introduce several time limits that are to 
facilitate the procedure and some improvements in the planning of the work or-
44 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K 4/06.
45 The large number of legislative proceedings conducted within a given term of office of the Sejm 
determines that individual deputies and senators may not have an objective opportunity to thoroughly 
familiarize themselves with the documents relating to each of these proceedings. This means that 
they are forced to act with confidence in the conclusions of the individual parliamentary committees 
or clubs to which they belong. On the other hand, they can obtain knowledge about planned legal 
solutions even before the formal implementation of a legislative initiative by an authorized entity, in 
a situation where the most important assumptions are widely discussed in the media.
46 L. Garlicki rightly points out that the exception relating to “laws regulating the system and 
competence of public authorities” may raise most problems with interpretation. See L. Garlicki, 
Komentarz do art. 123 Konstytucji, [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej…, p. 7.





ganization of the chambers. First of all, there was not even an instructional time 
limit for the Sejm to comment on the urgent bill, i.e. to pass a bill or reject a bill47.
Whereas the so-called fast-tracked legislation is based only on Article 51 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Sejm. In fact, the essence of this institution consists in 
deviating from the minimum time limits for proceedings at the parliamentary stage. 
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, in particularly justified cases, the Sejm may 
shorten the procedure with bills and draft resolutions by: 1) beginning the first reading 
immediately after receiving the bill or draft resolution by deputies; 2) beginning the 
second reading immediately after the conclusion of the first reading without referring 
the bill draft resolution to the committees; 3) beginning the second reading imme-
diately after the receipt by the deputies of a copy of a committee report. There is no 
equivalent of the quoted provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Senate. This is due 
to the fact that Senate Rules of Procedure do not use minimum time limits reserved 
for individual activities in legislative proceedings, so there is no need to introduce 
exceptions to them. Additionally, the introduction of constitutional maximum time 
limits for the work of the Senate is sufficiently mobilizing.
The application of the fast-tracked legislation does not violate the norm resulting 
from Article 123 of the Polish Constitution48. One should agree with the view that 
appropriate cooperation between the most important state authorities may lead to 
the importance of concluding the legislative procedure faster than in the case of the 
urgent procedure49. It is not surprising then that the urgent procedure is relatively 
rarely used.
EFFECTS OF VIOLATION OF THE TIME LIMITS FOR SUBJECTS OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE AND THEIR RIGHTS (COMPETENCES)
The effects of failure to meet the time limits in the legislative procedure can 
also be considered through the prism of the effects of the procedural rights of indi-
vidual participants in the procedure. It is primarily about the answer to the question 
whether there is a loss of entitlement (competence) to perform a specific action in 
a specific proceeding with the expiry of the time limit.
There is no doubt as to the fact that the Senate exceeds the constitutional time 
limit (usually 30 days) for adopting a position on the act results in the loss of the 
right to adopt amendments or adopt a resolution rejecting the act in its entirety. 
47 This aspect is emphasized in particular by S. Patyra. The author, therefore, questions the real, 
practical benefits of using the urgent procedure. He points to examples of undoubtedly protracted 
proceedings against urgent bills at the parliamentary stage. See S. Patyra, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
48 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 March 2006, K 4/06.
49 S. Patyra, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
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With the failure to exercise the Senate’s rights within a specified period of time, the 
provisions of the Constitution are bound by a legal fiction – the act is recognized 
as adopted in the wording adopted by the Sejm50.
The President, within a specified constitutional period (usually 21 days), is 
required to sign the adopted bill or exercise his veto right or submit an application 
to the Constitutional Tribunal initiating preventive control51. There is no clear in-
dication of what legal consequences a violation of this time limit by the President 
would have. It seems, however, that the expiry of the time limit results in the loss 
of the President’s ability to exercise his rights to the act, i.e. to submit a request to 
the Constitutional Tribunal or to apply the right of veto. However, there would still 
be an obligation to sign the adopted law. It should be stated that in such a case, the 
provisions do not formulate any legal fiction, be it assuming that the proposed act 
is deemed signed or that the President has implicitly exercised his right of veto. 
There is no doubt that without the act being signed by the President, it cannot be 
published in the Journal of Laws, and thus the act cannot enter into force.
In the practice so far, it has never happened that the President did not take any 
action against the adopted bill within his due time. Such a situation may, how-
ever, happen in the future, as a result of random events or as a result of a serious 
political crisis.
In my opinion, the possible signing of the act after the time limit should not 
make the act unconstitutional. Adopting a different view would lead to a situation 
in which the President, by omission, dependent solely on his will, could determine 
the significant defectiveness of each law. Therefore, there would be a ground for its 
subsequent questioning and elimination from the legal system for formal reasons. 
This would be contrary to the purpose of Article 122 of the Polish Constitution and 
would infringe the rights of other participants in legislative proceedings.
The exercise of rights after the expiry of the time limit – the result of the expiry 
would be its loss within a specific proceeding would always be an act without a legal 
basis and should be qualified as a material breach of the proceeding. Signing the 
adopted bill is an obligation, not a right of the President.
The view of the Constitutional Tribunal52 concerning yet another type of vio-
lation of the time limit reserved for the President is controversial. This would take 
place when there are fewer than 21 days left until the enacted law is passed to the 
President. In practice, such a situation may occur when the date of entry into force 
has been specified by indicating a calendar date, while the legislative procedure 
itself with regard to this act has been delayed. First, it is difficult to show that any 
50 Article 121 para. 2 of the Polish Constitution.
51 Article 122 of the Polish Constitution.
52 See judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2019, Kp 1/19 together with the 
dissenting opinion of judge of the Constitutional Tribunal M. Muszyński.





such situation violates the provisions of the Constitution. The President might have 
had the will to make a decision right away, without waiting for the time limit to 
end. Secondly, the wording of the law does not affect the powers of the President, 
who can still exercise his powers within the time prescribed by law.
However, it should be agreed that in some cases this will lead to the defec-
tiveness of the act, in the form of violation of the relevant vacatio legis. It should 
also be borne in mind that an adopted bill with a calendar entry into force may be 
the subject of a veto or a preventive motion to the Constitutional Tribunal. These 
procedures also take a certain time. It may therefore turn out that the President will 
be obliged to sign the adopted bill, even if the date of entry into force specified in 
it has long expired. Of course, in such a situation, the time limit for the President’s 
decision would not expire, as its course would then be suspended.
It would be worth considering the theoretical possibility of issuing by the 
Constitutional Tribunal, in similar cases, scope judgements declaring the unconsti-
tutionality of the provision constituting the entry into force of the act, in the scope 
in which it provides for the validity of the act in the period from the date indicated 
therein to the date specifically specified in which the act should enter into force 
while maintaining the correct vacatio legis. Such a decision could at the same time 
ensure the protection of individual rights and save a normative act, the content of 
which would not raise constitutional doubts. Scope judgements are currently issued 
in the so-called legislative omissions.
The specific time limit is related to the principle of discontinuity. Its essence is 
the prohibition of the continuation by the parliament of the new term of office of 
proceedings not completed in the previous parliamentary term53. Of course, there 
are a number of exceptions54.
CONCLUSION
As the presented analysis shows, the problem of time limits is an extremely 
important procedural issue in the legislative procedure. Both the violation of consti-
tutional and statutory time limits may lead to the elimination of the entire normative 
act from legal circulation. This is evidenced by the latest decisions of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, which may become a permanent line of jurisprudence in the future, 
very different from the existing, well-established views. Recognition of the nature of 
individual time limits and their proper calculation is therefore of decisive importance 
in the process of legislating and assessing its conformity to the Constitution.
53 See L. Bosek, Komentarz do art. 98 Konstytucji, teza 9, [in:] Konstytucja RP, vol. 2: Komentarz 
do art. 87–243, eds. M. Safjan, L. Bosek, Warszawa 2016.
54 See M. Radajewski, op. cit., pp. 155–170.
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STRESZCZENIE
Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie problematyki związanej z terminami wyznaczonymi poszczegól-
nym organom władzy publicznej (Sejm, Senat, Prezydent RP) na wykonanie określonych czynności 
w ramach postępowania legislacyjnego. Terminy te należy obliczać według reguł konwencjonalnych, 
a więc od początku dnia następnego po dniu, w którym nastąpiła czynność, z którą przepisy prawa 
wiążą rozpoczęcie terminu. Czynność będzie jednak skuteczna również wtedy, gdy zostanie wykonana 
w tym samym dniu, w którym nastąpiło wspomniane zdarzenie. Naruszenie terminu w postępowaniu 
ustawodawczym ma zasadnicze znaczenie dla ustawy, jako aktu normatywnego, w zakresie jej obo-
wiązywania. Trybunał Konstytucyjny, w ramach kontroli konstytucyjności prawa, dokonuje także 
badania prawidłowości postępowania, w którym doszło do jego ustanowienia. Według najnowszego 
orzecznictwa TK naruszenie terminów minimalnych, wymaganych przy dokonywaniu poszczegól-
nych czynności, które zostały określone jedynie w regulaminie Sejmu, może stanowić samodzielną 
podstawę do stwierdzenia niekonstytucyjności całej ustawy. Stanowisko to odbiega znacząco od 
dotychczasowego, ugruntowanego stanowiska w tym przedmiocie. Skutki naruszenia terminów po-
stępowania ustawodawczego można rozważać również na płaszczyźnie uprawnień poszczególnych 
organów, w ramach konkretnego postępowania. Podpisanie ustawy przez Prezydenta, po upływie 
konstytucyjnego terminu, powinno zostać uznane jako prawnie skuteczne. Należy rozważyć dopusz-
czalność wydawania przez Trybunał Konstytucyjny wyroków zakresowych w sytuacjach naruszenia 
reguł poprawnej legislacji, prowadzących do pominięcia lub skrócenia vacatio legis.
Słowa kluczowe: legislacja; postępowanie; termin; Trybunał Konstytucyjny; Sejm; Senat; ustawa
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